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Abstract In this paper, I discuss and analyze three instances of exchange and
interaction between Russian (incl. Soviet) and (West) European philosophical
culture: the correspondence between Merab Mamardasˇvili and Louis Althusser,
Jacques Derrida’s visit to Moscow in 1990, and a joint Russian–German publication
by Nikolaj Plotnikov and Alexander Haardt. The focus is on the implicit mutual
perception of philosophical cultures and on the ‘micro-politics’ of discourse that is
at stake in their interaction. Also, it is shown how different contexts—labelled
‘philosophical culture’, though not in any deterministic sense—are at work in the
mutual perception between individual thinkers. Even if philosophical thinking tends
to transcend the parameters of ‘glocal’ situations, this involves a job that needs to be
done, individually and collectively, by the philosophers involved. Consequently,
this dimension has to be taken into account when analysing such instances of
encounter.
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Eine genuin russische Philosophie ist als Projekt durchaus im Entstehen…
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To transcend the limits of one’s native culture does not constitute betrayal,
because the limits of any culture are too narrow for the full range of human
potentials.
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I’m back in the U.S.S.R.
You don’t know how lucky you are boy
Back in the U.S.S.R.
John Lennon, Paul McCartney (1968)1
Introduction
The world in which we live is, among others, marked by a complex process that
usually goes under the name of ‘globalization’, and that has been the topic of a host of
academic and non-academic publications. This notion has given rise to many different
definitions and periodizations, which need not concern us here: much depends on
whether one looks at globalization as a social scientist, a historian, an economist, a
member of Bauman’s extra-territorial elite (Bauman 1988, 18–26), or a concerned
citizen. According to some, the world has been ‘globalizing’ ever since humankind
came into being and networks of commercial and cultural exchange developed—from
this perspective, present-day globalization is merely an acceleration of processes that
were already taking place, and the difference is quantitative only. According to others,
these same processes have reached a qualitatively new level, viz. a level at which the
world has become ‘one’ in ways in which it was not ‘one’ before and, perhaps more
significantly, beyond which further unification seems impossible: the density of
networks and connections can still increase, but not their global scope. I start this
paper with an admittedly speculative sketch of the present condition of ‘our world’.
Most striking, if one takes a little distance, is the fact that those processes that can
be placed under the umbrella notion ‘globalization’, i.e. the ‘shrinking’ of time and
space and the increase in the possible scope of effect of human actions, exist
alongside with processes of ‘localization’ that go in the opposite direction:
individuals, groups, discourse communities, etc.—retreating to fixed identities,
sticking together, and establishing relations of mutual exclusion without precedent
in history. The discursive construction of a plurality of ‘worlds’ is not the privilege
of theorists like Samuel Huntington, but takes place within those worlds, too—the
‘Islamic world’ being a clear case in point-, and also manifests itself in softer forms
such as the multiculturalism that used to be politically correct in Western societies.
What these discourses have in common is their ‘culturism’, i.e. an understanding of
culture as a relatively coherent and substantial unit in which some people live and
work while others do not (Schinkel 2007). Relations between cultures thus
understood take the shape of domination, exclusion, resistance or, at best, toleration.
Bringing the two lines together, the world in which we live can indeed be
qualified as being simultaneously one and many in a new way. Since the world, at
least in the geographical sense, has always been ‘one’, and since humankind has
always, in a variety of ways (language and religion, for example), been ‘many’, it
must be the ‘new way’ that makes the difference. The best way to describe this new
way is, to my mind, the following: the world-as-a-whole has become the inevitable
shared object of action and reflection of humans, yet there is not a single place or
1 Lennon, John, Paul McCartney, “Back in the USSR”, Apple Records, 1968.
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position from which this world-as-a-whole can be approached or assessed, let alone
judged. Many forms of subjectivity, here understood as particular combinations of
awareness and agency, know themselves to be related to the world-as-a-whole, while
at the same time they know themselves to be embedded in specific cultural contexts
and backgrounds. What is new is not this constellation in itself, i.e. as a
constellation of individual and collective subjects, but the fact that it has become the
known shared condition of all. What is new is not the socio-economic and cultural
process of globalization, but the inescapable realization (in the double sense) of the
world-as-a-whole—a condition aptly described as mondialisation by Jacques
Derrida (2001, 13).
With very few exceptions, everybody in the world today knows that she or he or
the ‘we’ of which she or he considers herself or himself a member, is one among
many similar ‘we’s’, and that the totality of these ‘we’s’ exhausts humankind. This
is not the place to engage in a phenomenology of all actual and possible ‘we’s’:
many of them exist over longer periods of time, they overlap, they are organized
around past, present, and future perspectives, and they may or may not explicitly
relate to the world-as-a-whole or to humankind as such. Some are oriented towards
an all-inclusive ‘we’, others are part of ‘we’ versus ‘them’ constellations.
Everybody in the world also knows that one’s actions have effects upon the same
world-as-a-whole that are beyond one’s control by default. This new human
condition serves to explain the proliferation of identity discourses: if the rest of the
world is both beyond our control and at our doorstep, the ‘we’ of each doorstep
must define itself in terms that can withstand any confrontation. The basic mode of
‘we’-existence worldwide thus has become defensive.
Philosophy has traditionally been an activity in which all forms of determination,
whether religious, cultural, or socio-political, are transcended, and at the same time
articulated. Philosophy, as Hegel wrote, is its time grasped in thought [“ihre Zeit, in
Gedanken erfaßt”], i.e. it is the reflection of a ‘time’ upon itself, in which it realizes
both that it is merely a ‘time’, while at the same it realizes, i.e. both becomes aware
and ‘makes real’, that there is no other time but the sum of all ‘times’. This has not
changed: philosophy still is the place where ‘a time’ grasps itself in thought. The
objection that philosophy clearly does not succeed in this ‘grasping’ since, instead
of a unitary position or ‘system’, it yields a plurality of positions and oppositions
(which is the shortest way to describe the present state of philosophy), or that
philosophy’s role has been taken over by social science or by the variety of holistic
visions that yield an overall picture, to my mind does not hold. What if, in fact,
philosophy, in its present state of plurality without centre, is grasping its time and
thus realizing it at the level of thought? We arguably live in a world without
synthesis, without ultimate truth or ground, without repères de la certitude (Lefort
1983, 84), without centre, and we know it. Even those who, like the Pope of the
Roman Catholic Church, or militant Islamists, continue to think and argue in terms
of a ‘centre’ (be it geographic or other), know that they have to relate to a plurality
of other centres. Given this predicament, there are three modes of relating to it:
denial, suppression, and full realization. As has always been the case, philosophy’s
task is to realize this human condition, to face the predicament and think it (this is
not to suggest that it is philosophy’s exclusive task its privilege).
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This predicament, and philosophy’s position in and with respect to it, provides
the general background of any attempt to assess concrete instances of doing
philosophy. Philosophy always takes place in a concrete historical, socio-political,
and cultural situation, to which it relates reflexively, thus generating part of its own
conditions of possibility. This does not mean that all philosophers are permanently
aware of this—on the contrary: to the extent to which the conditions of existence of
philosophy are ‘established’, they tend to be forgotten, just like living in a stable
democratic polity, for example, makes citizens forget the contingent nature of that
polity. The encounter between different philosophical cultures, however, increases
this awareness and can make participants self-conscious or, in reaction to that,
offensive.2 The difference between philosophical cultures comes to the fore, at least,
at three points: in differences of external conditions, in differences of language, and
in different frames of reference—or horizons, if one prefers. Three examples
illustrate these points.
First of all, it can be a shock for a Western philosopher to find that a non-Western
colleague is not as free to say whatever she or he thinks, just as it can, conversely, be
a shock for this non-Western philosopher to encounter free thinking. The effect can
be an attempt to change the situation, it can also be a turning-away, but in both
cases, the effect is (increased) awareness of the intrinsic link between philosophical
thought and political freedom and of the less than obvious reality of that link.
Secondly, it can be a surprise, pleasant or unpleasant, that not everything one thinks
can be expressed without remainder in another language: some concepts prove to be
untranslatable, well-known examples being notions such as sobornost’ or Aufhe-
bung or dispositif (Cassin et al. 2004). Such a confrontation can serve as ground to
idealize such concepts, claiming that only a particular language is capable of
expressing certain essential truths. It can equally serve as a ground to reject those
same notions, blaming Russian or German thinkers for generating endless series of
abstractions. The same confrontation can, finally, lead to an adoption of those terms
in philosophical parlance or jargon. In all cases, however, the net effect will be a
rupture of the naively realistic assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between
terms and realities—the assumption can be reclaimed of course, but in that case it
will be no longer naive. Thirdly, it can come as a surprise to find that colleagues
from a different philosophical culture have a different horizon with different
landmarks. Compare the status of ‘classical German idealism’ in Russian
philosophical culture with the reputation of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling in UK
or USA, or the status of ibn-Khaldu¯n or ibn-Rushd/Averroe¨s in Arabic and in
European philosophy respectively.3 Again, one can relate to such confrontations
very differently, but never ‘neutrally’: the net effect therefore is, again, increased
awareness of the non-obvious character of one’s own perception.4
2 To be sure, this is not to suggest that there is a finite number of clearly demarcated philosophical
cultures: some clearly demarcate themselves, others don’t. Often, philosophers only realize the specificity
of their own philosophical culture through their confrontation with another, undeniably different one.
3 In a private conversation, the Moroccan philosopher Mohamed Mesbahi argued that the only Islamic
philosopher that the West has ever acknowledged is ibn-Rushd, and they misinterpret him.
4 For a discussion, see Botz-Bornstein and Hengelbrock (2006), and, in that volume, Vade´n (2006).
262 E. Zweerde
123
The upshot of this brief discussion is a realization of the ‘glocal’ character of
philosophical culture,5 i.e. of the fact that, although local philosophical cultures
retain many of their specific characteristics, related to language, philosophical
tradition, socio-political circumstances, etc., they are remarkably and increasingly
similar in the ways in which they relate to global philosophical culture: the global
perspective, which inescapably presents itself, is adapted to local circumstances, but
it is precisely in this process of adaptation that similarities come into being that did
not exist before. In this paper, I look at the ‘glocalization’ of philosophy, the latter
being understood as a specific type of intellectual activity that takes place in what I
label ‘philosophical culture’. The specific focus is on the way in which Russian and
European philosophical culture interact with each other. Elementary forms of
exchange between philosophical cultures are correspondence, interview, and
cooperation. In what follows, I therefore discuss three cases of ‘transfer and
interaction’ between Russian and European philosophy: the published correspon-
dence between Louis Althusser and Merab Mamardasˇvili (1966–1980), the
discussion of Jacques Derrida with three Russian philosophers: Natalja Avtonom-
ova, Valerij Podoroga, and Mikhail Ryklin (1990), and the joint project (2005–
2008) on personal’nost’ of Alexander Haardt and Nikolaj Plotnikov. In doing this, I
apply the notions just outlined, but since we are not simply dealing with ‘empirical’
data, even if an empirical dimension is always involved and more important than we
realize, the test does not even come close to an attempt to refute a hypothesis. Rather,
we are in a field in which hermeneutics is the only feasible approach, and in which, by
the end of the day, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating, i.e. if the conception
here suggested helps us tomakemore sense of our experience.My focus will be on the
often implicit perception of their philosophical culture by the participants.
Troubled marxists in a torn-apart Europe
In the period between Merab Mamardasˇvili’s visit to Louis Althusser in 1966 and
the latter’s admission to a psychiatric hospital in 1980, the two philosophers
maintained a private correspondence, the retrieved part of which was recently edited
and published by Annie Epelboin, who often acted as a go-between, carrying letters
across the border and telling Althusser about the situation in the USSR (Epelboin
2008, 170). Notwithstanding the difference in age (12 years) and status as
theoreticians, the two developed a close and warm friendship. It did not, however,
lead to a profound dialogue or a noticeable influence (op.cit., 171). They shared, in
those days at least, an interest in the works of Marx: Pour Marx (1965) and
“Aнaлиз coзнaния в paбoтax Mapкca (1968) [Analysis of Consciousness
in the Works of Marx]” are rightly ranked as classics in Marxist philosophy
(Mamardashvili 1986). But while Althusser was not only a deeply convinced
Marxist who wanted “to understand what Marxism really means” (Althusser 1976,
5 I use “glocalization” in the sense given by Robert Robertson (1998); cf. also the definition by the well-
known writer and feminist Nawal el-Saadawi: “Globalization is imposed from above… Glocalization is
the opposite movement. It is the power stemming from the oppressed world wide to change the situation
to their benefit” (quoted from Bendadi (2008), 25; translation from the Dutch mine, EvdZ).
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141), but also a loyal member of the French communist party, Mamardasˇvili took a
purely philosophical interest in Marx, was not a ‘Marxist’ (Mamardasˇvili 2004, 169
and 211), never mind a communist, and found much more philosophical substance
in Husserl or Kant. It can be argued, by the way, that Althusser found greater
philosophical substance in Spinoza, but was hampered by his dogmatic Marxism
(Montag 1995, 65f).
If we approach the case of Althusser and Mamardasˇvili in terms of philosophical
cultures and their interaction, we should emphasize, first of all, that each of them
was ‘marginal’ in his own philosophical culture. Althusser certainly was a celebrity
in left-wing intellectual circles in the 1970s and 1980s, but his position, though
respected, became oppositional rather than mainstream after 1968, while
Mamardasˇvili, in the same year, lost his illusions about the humanity of socialism
and became a semi-dissident (Epelboin 2008, 169), a ‘marginal’ figure institution-
ally and, later on, a cult-figure and “role model for the intelligentsia” (Boobbyer
2005, 198; Swiderski 2006, 137–139). Still each of them was unmistakably part of
their local philosophical culture: in the case of Althusser the French Marxist circles,
which formed a sub-culture in France and Europe, and in the case of Mamardasˇvili
Soviet philosophical culture, which turned him into its bestimmte Negation (Van der
Zweerde 2006, 180–186).
For both thinkers, the events of 1968 were crucial, but in opposite ways.
Althusser deplored the fact that the “quasi-revolution” in Paris in May lacked a
Lenin, a person who could “foresee it and direct it” (Epelboin 2008, 177). For him,
Marxism failed to assume the political role that its theory implied. By contrast
Mamardasˇvili, who felt the oppression that took hold of Soviet life after the crack
down in Prague in August, decidedly turned against any possible ‘political’ role of
philosophy, Marxism included, thus taking the truly political step: “For us, the right
politics is the depolitization of philosophy [Pour nous, la bonne politique, c’est la
de´politisation de la philosophie]…” (Epelboin 2008, 178f; Epelboin 2009, 357f).
They wrote to each other in this period, and from this episode in their
correspondence a clear difference between the socio-political conditions of
philosophical culture appears: while Mamardasˇvili had no choice but to remain as
quiet as possible within his niche at the Institut Rabočego Dviženija, Althusser had
the free choice to stop his collaboration with the Soviet authorities and with the
PCF—an act which, as Epelboin rightly emphasizes, would have been truly
political, and a step which Mamardasˇvili suggested he should take (ibid.). Instead,
he dramatically closed his eyes and mind (Epelboin 2008, 182–186; Epelboin 2009,
360–363).
The encounters with a significantly more ‘free’ philosophical culture that
Mamardasˇvili had experienced in Prague in the early 1960s made him painfully
aware of the specificities of Soviet philosophical culture, even if personally he
managed to remain as cheerful as before. When Althusser finally visited the USSR
in 1974 on the occasion of the Hegel-congress, Mamardasˇvili introduced him to his
milieu, the philosophical circles that existed between dissent and officialdom.
Althusser, however, refused to arrive at the obvious conclusion that the USSR was
an oppressive system with little space for creative work in philosophy, Marxist
philosophy included—a country in which, in fact, he would have been in serious
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trouble himself. His well known “Ide´ologie et appareils ide´ologiques d’E´tat” of
1970 is intended as a critique of class societies, but was in fact eminently applicable
to the USSR.
With the advantage of hindsight, it is possible to relate Althusser’s incapacity to
face the political realities of his day to his mental illness, and to consider him a
‘case’ “in the sense in which one speaks of a ‘Wagner case’ or a ‘Nietzsche case’”.6
Epelboin finds it too easy, however, to oppose Mamardasˇvili and Althusser as ‘le
Sage et le Fou’, because what drew them together was not only their pedagogical
talent, but also their concern for each other and their profound friendship (Epelboin
2008, 190). Yet in the Russian version of the text, she does include a reference to
Althusser’s “mental illness,” while in the French version she merely mentions “a
fundamental disequilibrium.” In line with this, Althusser’s “capacite´ a` tenir des
propos e´loigne´s de toute re´alite´” is rephrased, for the Russian readership, as “the
capacity to express completely meaningless judgements [cпocoбнocтью выcк-
aзывaть coвepшeннo бeccмыcлeнныe cyждeния]” (Epelboin 2008, 171;
Epelboin 2009, 350). Epelboin’s invaluable publication, which is the material
presence, in both philosophical cultures, of the history of this philosophical
friendship across the Iron Curtain, thus manifests the very ‘double speak’ that
marked their exchange.
We can thus see this correspondence as a reflection of the difference between two
philosophical cultures: an oppressive one that turned philosophy into a political
instrument, a culture which Mamardasˇvili refused to recognize, a refusal for which
he paid a high price but by virtue of which he retained his dignity, on the one hand;
and on the other hand one which combined freedom of public expression with the
utter ineffectiveness of philosophical theory for want of a Lenin—a culture whose
advantages Althusser refused to countenance. They thus both ended up as prominent
inhabitants within the philosophical counter-cultures of their respective countries. It
is clear why, in contrast to the dominant Soviet culture and due to his ‘marginalized’
place in it. Mamardasˇvili is celebrated today as one of the few ‘real thinkers’ of the
Soviet era. If not by virtue of the content of his thinking, then at least by its form, his
free-style “consciousness aloud [coзнaниe вcлyx],” he saved genuine philosophical
thinking (Mamardasˇvili 2004, 87). Althusser, on the contrary, is mostly remembered
as the tragic figure who strangled his wife and of whose ‘dogmatic’ Marxism little
remains today. Both suffered, one feels tempted to say: one because he was on the
right side of the wrong situation, the other because he remained on the wrong side of
the right situation. Such judgments, however, suffer from what one could call the
‘disadvantage of hindsight’, and thus not only fall short of doing justice to the
theoretical merit of their writings, but also, and more importantly, fail to see the real
opposition between two thinkers one of whom wrote, in 1989, that “thought exists
only in its very occurrence, only in a space that is not occupied by prejudices,
prohibitions, etc.” (Mamardasˇvili 2004, 42),7 while the other stated, in 1975, that
6 ‘…qui fait d’Althusser un “cas”, au sens ou` l’on parle d’un “cas Wagner” ou d’un “cas Nietzsche”…’
(Rosset 1992, quoted from Epelboin 2008, 189.
7 ‘Мысль существует только в исполнении, только в пространстве, незанятом никакими предрассуд-
ками, запретами и т.д.’
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“une philosophie… n’existe que par la position qu’elle occupe, et n’occupe cette
position qu’en la conque´rant sur le plein d’un monde de´ja` occupe´” (Althusser 1976,
141). The difference between a metaphysics of free thought in unoccupied space
and a metaphysics of struggle between positions in a single replete space obtains its
full significance only against the background of the distinct philosophical cultures
within which these positions were expressed.
Back to the USSR!! Derrida and Moscow postmodernists
In February 1990, the year in which both Mamardasˇvili (in November) and Althusser
(in October) died, Jacques Derrida was in Moscow for a two-week visit. This trip
clearly made an enormous impression on him: the long report on this trip, which he
presented amonth later in California, clearly showsDerrida’s awareness—sometimes
bordering on hyper-awareness—of the historical parallels, the determining condi-
tions, the selective character, and the singular significance of his voyage. Contrary to
Althusser 15 years earlier, Derrida appears to have been all eyes and ears, without
naı¨vete´ or wishful thinking, and fully aware of the historical significance of
perestrojka, not only for the then still existing USSR, but also for “Bucarest, Prague,
Budapest, Berlin” (Derrida 1995, 37). During his visit, he met with three well-known
Russian philosophers, Natalja Avtonomova, Valerij Podoroga, andMikhail Ryklin, at
the Laboratory for Post-Classical Philosophical Investigations of the Institute of
Philosophy for a conversation on philosophy and literature.
The conversation itself was bilingual: Derrida spoke English, the three Russian
philosophers spoke Russian, and Elena Petrovskaja provided the translation. The
text of this conversation first appeared in Russian in 1993, edited by the Russian
participants (Ryklin 1993, 151–186). A German translation of this Russian edition
was published in 1995 (Ackermann et al. 1995, 173–199), and a French version
appeared in the same year, translated from the English and authorized by Derrida
(Derrida 1995, 103–155). In the interview, Derrida says: “Il y a traduction et la
traduction est impossible” (Derrida 1995, 120), and the German editors use this
statement as a motto for their publication as a whole: “U¨bersetzung ist unmo¨glich—
aber es gibt die U¨bersetzung” (Ackermann et al. 1995, 11). Ironically, the original of
which these two statements are the translation is itself a translation, since the
‘original original’ was Derrida’s spoken English. As Ryklin puts it: “Im
vorliegenden Fall fungiert die U¨bersetzung selbst als Original” (Ackermann et al.
1995, 260).8 However, the French and the German version do not state the same
thing: the first reads “There is translation and the translation is impossible,” which
in English sounds awkward unless one stresses “the,” suggesting “the single
translation” or “the (only) real translation”; the German version reads “Translation
is impossible, but there is the translation,” which also sounds awkward and which, if
taken literally, contradicts the French version: the translation is impossible, but there
is the translation. This would make sense, for example, if one stresses and modifies:
“The translation is impossible, yet there is this translation,” i.e. the one the reader is
8 Quoted from Ryklin (1993), 7.
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holding in her or his hands. This does make sense, since they were speaking about
the plurality of translations of a poem by Cle´ment Marot.9
The text of the original English recording was: “There is translation. Translation is
impossible….”10 This text leaves open the connection between the two phrases, thus
allowing both “and,” “but”, and “yet.” Moreover, the phrase does not contain any
articles, contrary to the German and French versions just quoted: it contains the ‘zero
article’. The Russian version is unambiguous with respect to the connection, but
ambiguous with respect to the articles: “Boт пepeвoд—нo пepeвoд нeвoзмoжeн”
(Avtonomova et al. 1993, 162). In Russian, this is a grammatically correct sentence,
but it leaves, contrary to the English zero article, the article undecided: it can be both
“the” or “a”; with emphatic “нo” the Russian makes a clear choice for an opposition:
“but”. This fits the German translation, with its “aber,” but it contradicts the French
“et” in the version that was authorized by Derrida (Avtonomova et al. 1995a, b).
However—and here we really get to the bottom of the difficulty—Derrida was
speaking English, not his native tongue, however well he spoke it. An ‘idealist’ might
ask whether he was saying in English what he was thinking in French, a ‘structuralist’
would argue that that is an impossible question by definition, whereas a ‘realist’ like
Derrida himself would claim that it is impossible to reach behind the actual utterance,
yet there is a différance between thought and utterance that serves to explain why, in
what we say, there inescapably are the traces of imperfection of our own expression,
implying, among other things, that “I don’t know how to say what I think” is not a
nonsensical statement. Derrida authorized the French version, but he did this several
years after the event… so this was what he then thought he had meant when he said it
in English a few years earlier. Even though we do knowwhat was said initially, we are
still with the same problem of translation from English into Russian, and then French
and German: which of the four variants expresses ‘what Derrida was thinking’? The
possibility exits, of course, that this was a post-modernist tongue in cheek game,
meant precisely to show, rather than ‘say’, the issue at stake, but even then, the
question remains, since obviously the participants were thinking and expressing what
they thought.
What does this mean for the understanding of philosophical culture? The
important thing to note here is that we are not dealing with a philosophical concept
that is bound to a particular philosophical tradition, such as sobornost’ or Aufhebung
or dispositif, but, on the contrary, with an everyday concept that can be
unequivocally translated: translation, U¨bersetzung, traduction, пepeвoд. We are,
however, dealing with an important philosophical category, namely determinacy.
Here, the corresponding notions in Russian and German, oпpeдeлённocть and
Bestimmtheit, cannot be unequivocally rendered in English or French: determinacy
and determinedness, de´termination and de´terminicite´ do not cover the meaning.
More importantly, however, the absence of articles in Russian (and other Slavonic
languages), contrasting with their presence in Latin and Germanic ones, determines
9 Avtonomova tells, during the conversation, that Douglas Hofstadter had taken a poem by Marot and
sent it to his friends all over the world, including herself, asking them to translate it and send it back, if
possible even in several versions (Derrida 1995, 199f; Ackermann et al. 1995, 181).
10 My gratitude goes to Dirk Uffelmann for providing the original text.
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the range of possible renderings. Therefore, what holds for a translation of poetry,
equally holds for philosophy: the exactly intended meaning cannot be rendered, and
there is no place for synthesis or compromise—only for explanatory notes. Hence
there is a specific philosophical content that is bound up with the determinations—
linguistic ones, in this case—of the philosophical culture at hand. The encounter
between different philosophical cultures makes clear, to the participants, that there
is no one-to-one correspondence between singular terms in different languages (and,
within languages, idioms, vocabularies, etc.). There is no extra-linguistic ‘point’
from where to tackle such problems, yet everything in the encounter points in its
direction.
Irrespective of whether somebody prefers the abstraction of German, the
indeterminacy of Russian, the elastic rationality of French, or the common sense
character of English, irreducible differences are at work here. Such perceptions and
preferences stem from a position that transcends the ‘philosophical culture of
departure’ yet remains bound to it in the sense, at least, that thought must be
expressed in some language. There is no such thing as ‘language in general’, except
in the speculation of philosophers like Vladimir Solov’e¨v.11 These speculations are
far from idealistic: transcending the determinations of any language is ‘real’ in
every attempt at translation or at understanding across languages. It is this
translingual and transcultural transcendence which opens a realm of philosophy
beyond linguistic determination: it is connected to what E˙pstein labels “the right to
live beyond one’s culture, on the borders of cultures” (Berry et al. 1999, 82). One of
the emerging questions is whether such a movement of transcending the
particularity of one’s own philosophical culture takes one to a new ‘place’, e.g. a
universal culture, a culturally neutral universal humanity, as Solov’e¨v suggested, or
whether it is the movement of transcending that counts, a “transcendence into
nothing” as Mamardasˇvili called it, with the accompanying awareness that the
“borders of cultures” will be a place of endless discussion which by deﬁnition
transcends them (Mamardasˇvili 2004, 197).
At this point, we encounter two possible, opposed patterns of reaction. One
consists of a ‘jump’ towards an allegedly universal discursive space, i.e. global
philosophical culture, populated by philosophical cosmopolitans who communicate
and argue in a philosophical newspeak which, in fact, is a reduced form of English,
stripped of idiomatic expressions and enriched with technical jargon that, in
principle at least, can derive from any other language. Roughly speaking, this is the
language in which this paper is written. The alternative is a retreat into the
specificity of one’s own philosophical culture, intimately connected with a native
language, determined by the specificities of a local history (in the present-day world
usually a national one), and backed by an essentialist understanding of culture—
11 “True unity does not annul multiplicity but finds its realisation in it, setting it free from the limitations
of exclusiveness. One language inspired by the Spirit of God means communicability and understanding
between many distinct languages, which are divided but do not divide. (…) The true unity of languages is
found not in a single language but in an all-embracing language, that is, in an interpretation of all
languages which would make them equally understandable to all while the peculiarity of each would be
preserved” (Solov’e¨v 1988, 500f; cf. English translation: Solov’e¨v 2005, 365f).
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defensive parochialism and tolerant multiculturalism obviously share the same
culturism.
About two of Derrida’s three interlocutors, Podoroga and Ryklin, Ulrich Schmid
wrote:
In einem sehr grundsa¨tzlichen Sinne ist sogar das postmoderne Denken, das in
den neunziger Jahren in Russland Hochkunjunktor hatte, der Sowjetvergang-
enheit verhaftet geblieben: Das Auseinandertreten von Zeichen und
Bezeichnetem, das seinen archetypischen Ausdruck in der sinnlosen Nich-
tentsprechung von ritueller Propaganda und sowjetischer Alltagstristesse fand,
ist auch die semantische Grundlage der philosophischen Dekonstruktion, wie
sie etwa von Boris Groys, Mikhail Ryklin, Valerij Podoroga oder Mikhail
E˙pstein betrieben wird. Die Dekonstruktion sto¨ßt mithin in Russland auf ganz
andere Voraussetzungen als in Westeuropa… (Schmid 2003, 21) [italics mine,
EvdZ]
We might infer from this that the conditions of doing philosophy, in this case
post-modern(ist) philosophy, are strongly different in Russia from those in Europe,
due to irreversible historical differences, in this case the replacement, already in the
1930s, of signs with a ‘signified’ by ‘mere signs’ without reference—another word
for ‘vacuous ideology replacing reality’—and that this provides a typical example of
the general cultural and, in this case, also political conditions of philosophical
culture. While this is not per se untrue, it should be added that Schmid’s hidden
presupposition that in other situations, notably that of Western Europe, deconstruc-
tion is not confronted with such a “separation of signifier and signified” and that
European “ritual propaganda” and “Alltagstristesse” are totally different (or even
absent), is what really determines the interaction between the two philosophical
cultures. Both need to identify, and they do so by being each other’s constitutive
other.
It is part of the way in which these philosophical cultures, as distinct and
opposed, yet communicating, come into being, i.e. are discursively constructed, in
the first place, and it is part of the way in which the very title of Schmid’s book,
Russische Religionsphilosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts, begins to make any sense. If
we want to find an answer to the obvious question “Why is there such a thing as
‘Russian philosophy’ in the first place?,” if we want to avoid an essentialist
understanding in terms of a ‘Russian soul’, and if we yet want to maintain that the
notion ‘Russian philosophy’ means more than just the language in which
philosophical writings are stated, then we need to look at such ‘micro-constructions’
as titles, and the presuppositions and decisions that they entail.
In the reflected perception of both post-Soviet Russian philosophical culture and
the European academic culture from which Schmid practices his study of Russian
philosophy, there is a conviction that there was something speciﬁcally Soviet and
particularly wrong with Soviet socio-political reality, something which continues to
determine post-Soviet philosophical culture in Russia, just as there is a shared
assumption, between Schmid, his publisher, and their audience, that there is
something speciﬁcally Russian and particularly interesting about 20th century
Russian religious philosophy, something which continues to shape and justify the
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attention European philosophical culture pays to its Eastern neighbour. The point is
not in the truth or untruth of these convictions and assumptions, but in the way in
which they operate in the reproduction of a plurality of philosophical cultures,
reflecting each other.
Intimate asymmetry
In May 2005, the year in which Derrida’s Moscou aller-retour appeared in print, a
conference was held at RGGU in Moscow, financed by the German Volkswagens-
tiftung and jointly organized by Alexander Haardt and Nikolaj Plotnikov, two
philosophers who with their close cooperation materialize the revived close
cooperation between Russian andGerman thinkers. A few years later, the proceedings
of his conference appeared, in Russian (2007) and German (2008), and the two editors
wrote an introduction which appeared in both editions. Although the two versions of
the introduction are mostly identical, there are significant differences between them
that are instructive for the topic of this paper, i.e. the relation and interaction between
European—in this case: German12—and Russian philosophical cultures.
A first difference concerns philosophical vocabulary. The Russian edition begins
by stating the “self-evident conviction in contemporary philosophical discourse”
that the notion of person [личнocть] is “a key concept for the philosophical
consciousness of the West,” whereas the German edition makes the same claim
concerning the centrality of person [Person], but omits “the West,” stating instead
that it belongs to the “key notions, which articulate and reflect the basic assumptions
of human cognition and action”.13 The message is clear, yet different for both
audiences: within the context of German philosophical culture the book is about
philosophy of cognition and action tout court, whereas Russians implicitly are
offered the lazejka—to employ the Bakhtinian notion—to argue that what follows is
about Western, and thus not necessarily about their own ‘philosophical conscious-
ness’. The German introduction further elaborates, without any reference to
geography or language, thus situating the text at the level of ‘just philosophy’, the
conceptual field around ‘Person’ and suggests delineating a semantic field that
unites, in the way of Wittgensteinian family resemblances, various discourses of
‘Personalität’—the latter being, in German, a slightly academic notion, but one that
makes sense immediately. At this point, the Russian version has to make a move:
although ličnost’ is a common Russian word, that can be rendered alternatively as
person or personality, it is already an abstract notion. Consequently, when the
editors speak about the same semantic field they have to introduce a new notion, this
12 The “non-Russian” presence in conference and publications was largely German, but also included a
Polish-American-Swiss philosopher, Edward Swiderski, and a Dutch one—the author of this paper.
13 Haardt et al. (2008), 11: “In der philosophischen Diskussion der Gegenwart besteht ein weit
verbreiteter Konsens daru¨ber, dass der Begriff der Person zu den Schlu¨sselbegriffen geho¨rt, die die
Basisannahmen des menschlichen Erkennens und Handelns artikulieren und reflektieren”; Cf. Plotnikov
et al. 2007, 7: “Ubezˇdenie v tom, cˇto ponjatie ličnosti (v smysle lica - Person) javljaetsja kljucˇevym dlja




time entirely artificial, in order to point to “… a certain general field of meanings,
which can be designated with the artificial (for the Russian language) term of
personal’ nost’”.14 We thus witness here an attempt to enrich Russian philosophical
vocabulary: if this attempt is successful, it is in this very instance that the difference
between two philosophical cultures is actually overcome. More generally, it will
have to be in instances like this—given the fact that in Russia today philosophical
concepts are no longer introduced ‘from above’ as they were before (this remark
suggests indeed that one of the specific differences of Soviet philosophical culture
was the top–down introduction of vocabulary). If, in an unforeseeable future,
personal’ nost’ will have entered the standard vocabulary employed in philosophical
discourse in Russia, a difference will have been overcome, that now still exists in
the form of terminological hegemony: it is from German to Russian that this notion
is transferred, not the other way around. At the micro-level, therefore, we witness an
example of a process that has a history of at least two centuries: the adoption, within
Russian philosophical culture, of European, in particular German vocabulary (due to
grammatical similarities the translation of German philosophical language into
Russian is much easier than into French or English).
A second significant difference concerns asymmetry. Every philosophical culture
contains perceptions of all other philosophical cultures it has access to: this comes
to the fore in specialized fields of comparative studies (Arabic, Chinese, Indian
philosophy, etc.), in networks of people who are into this or that ‘other’ philosophy
(non-Western, African, native American, etc.), in conferences and summer schools,
in occasional elective university courses, etc. More generally, this asymmetry
appears in the images and perceptions of all other philosophical cultures within a
given philosophical culture, bearing in mind that these images and perceptions can
also be, as it were, ‘zero’, i.e. ‘absence’. For German philosophers—those who have
not specialized in the study of Russian philosophy, that is—it will generally come as
a (pleasant) surprise that Russia has a much stronger, more interesting, and more
lively philosophical culture than they would have expected. Anybody who is
familiar with the field knows the attempts, by specialists in Russian philosophy, to
raise interest in their area of study among their colleagues, and also knows that these
attempts are often in vain: to the extent to which it is different it is too exotic, to the
extent to which it is familiar there is no particular need to pay attention. This points
to an important asymmetry that, I suggest, has more to do with the general pattern of
relations between philosophical cultures than with the specific characteristics of the
two cultures in question. In other words: the general lack of interest and knowledge
with respect to Russian philosophy among West European philosophers has to do,
irrespective of the actual import of Russian philosophy, with the self-reproduction
of West Eurepean philosophical culture, which, like, any philosophical culture, has
to neutralize disturbing information from its ‘surrounding’ (not per se in the spatial
sense). Philosophical cultures differ from each other in how they relate to other
philosophical cultures, as well as to their ‘inner’ differentiation, but I venture the
hypothesis that certain patterns can be detected.
14 Plotnikov et al. 2007, 7: “… некое общее поле значений, которое можно обозначить искуственным
(для русского языка) термином персональность.”
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During the Soviet period, a clear distinction was established, in philosophy
curricula and in the organizational structure of philosophy departments, between
two fields of history of philosophy: istorija otečestvennoj ﬁlosoﬁi and istorija
zarubežnoj ﬁlosoﬁi. This distinction is still in place at Russian universities, and it
always strikes visitors from ‘the West’. It would be interesting to see if similar
distinctions are present in other major non-Western philosophical cultures: Chinese,
Arabic, Japanese, Indian, Turkish, etc.15 My hypothesis is that these cultures, in a
similar vein, broadly distinguish ‘native’ and ‘foreign’, whereas Western philosoph-
ical culture will distinguish between a number of ‘world philosophies’,—Chinese
philosophy, Indian philosophy, Islamic philosophy, Russian philosophy—on the one
hand and philosophy tout court, i.e. Western and global philosophy, on the other. This
difference points to an important asymmetry in perception that has to do with cultural
hegemony. There is a striking parallel here between philosophy departments and
music stores: in Russia the latter have sections for ‘fatherland music’ and ‘foreign
music’ respectively, whereas a Western music store will usually have a section for
‘world music’—an expression in which ‘world’ actually means ‘the rest of the
world’—and a larger section for music without further qualification. The shop owner
who putsManu Chau, YoussouN’Dour or Kolibri under ‘just music’ instead of ‘world
music’ makes a relevant decision in the micro-politics of culture. The point is not if
‘the West’ is ‘the best’ or ‘better’ than ‘the rest’, but that discourse is construed in
such a way that ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ come into existence, yielding, to quote
Samuel Huntington, a “world… divided between a Western one and a non-Western
many.”16
This asymmetry comes to the fore in a key sentence in the introduction by
Plotnikov and Haardt. After pointing out, with reference to the notion of “indicator”
in the Begriffsgeschichte introduced by Reinhart Koselleck, that “the concepts
which constitute the semantic field of personality… are key concepts for modern
European consciousness” (Haardt et al. 2008, 16; Plotnikov et al. 2007, 11), the
authors emphasize a “peculiarity of the discursive self-determination [Selbstbe-
stimmung/caмooпpeдeлeниe] of Russian thought,” namely “a conscious taking-
distance [Distanzierung/диcтaнциpoвaниe] from the language of European
philosophy,” which in the German rendering takes place “not infrequently [nicht
selten]” and in the Russian version “permanently [пocтoяннo]” (ibid.). The
asymmetry appears instantly if one imagines the opposite situation, viz., German
thought consciously taking a distance from the language of Russian philosophy.
Examples are a rejection of the Leninist principle of partijnost’ [Parteilichkeit,
usually rendered in English as partisanship, but actually better translated as
partymindedness17 of philosophy and other cultural and intellectual phenomena, or
a hesitation to identify too quickly the Slavophile notion of sobornost’ with the
concept of Gemeinschaft as found in To¨nnies. However, such issues are marginal in
15 For example, Zeynep Direk of Gatalasaray University, Istanbul, is engaging in an attempt to write, for
the first time in history, a non-biased history of Turkish philosophy that does not end with either the
beginning or the end of the Ottoman Empire.
16 Huntington (1998), 36; cf. the map of “The West and the Rest” on p. 22–23 in the same book.
17 Cf. Ballestrem (1964).
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German or European philosophical culture. The point, therefore, is not that there is a
difference in vocabulary, but that there is a contrast in the ways of dealing with it:
conscious and frequent distancing on the one hand, marginal hesitations on the
other.
A third difference comes to a fore, finally, when the editors point to a form of
Russian exceptionalism. They first indicate a similarity between German and
Russian philosophical culture in that in both cases “these concepts [“Person,”
“Perso¨nlichkeit,” “Ich,” “Subjekt,” EvdZ] are attributed a ‘key function’.” Then a
difference is pointed out when they state that because “they [the concepts just
mentioned, EvdZ] display (much like the concepts “Democracy,”, “Property,” and
“State”) a tendency towards ‘politicization’ and ‘ideologization’, this history
equally forms an important part of all-European Begriffsgeschichte” (Haardt et al.
2008, 16; Plotnikov et al. 2007, 11). Not only is a difference stated between Russian
and German philosophical culture, the latter apparently lacking ‘politicization’ or
‘ideologization’, which implicitly invokes the opposition between abused or
instrumentalized versus pure or genuine philosophy, but also this difference is stated
differently. It is reasonably supposed that Russian readers understand the notions of
ideologization and politicization without quotation marks, and they are likewise
assumed to understand the expression “European philosophical ideologemes,” an
assumption that fails with respect to the German audience, which is largely ignorant
of the very word “ideologeme.” In the German text we read: “Da in der russischen
Kultur—und Ideengeschichte diesen Begriffen ebenfalls eine ‚Schlu¨sselfunktion’
zugewiesen wird, und sie eine Tendenz zur ‚Politisierung’ und ‚Ideologisierung’
aufweisen (a¨hnlich Begriffen wie ‚Demokratie’, ‚Eigentum’, ‚Staat’), stellt auch
diese Geschichte einen wichtigen Part in der gesamteuropa¨ischen Beg-
riffsgeschichte dar”. In the Russian text: “Poskol’ku i v russkoj intellektual’noj
istorii e˙ti ponjatija vozvodjatsja v rang kljucˇevikh, pricˇem s kharakternoj dlja
evropejskikh ﬁlosofskikh “ideologem” tendenciej k politizacii i ideologizacii
(napodobie ponjatij “demokratija”, “sobstvennost’” ili “gosudarstvo”), postol’ku i
ona predstaet kak cˇast’ obsˇcˇeevropejskoj istorii ponjatij” [italics mine, EvdZ].
All this is certainly not meant as ‘criticism’ of the editors, Haardt and Plotnikov,
for adapting to the two different philosophical cultures they were dealing with.
Quite the contrary: they did a wonderful job. The point is, however, that they could
not not do a ‘job’ at this point—there is a job to be done. The way they did this job
reflects some of the peculiarities of the two philosophical cultures in their mutual
interaction: a certain hegemony in terms of philosophical vocabulary, an asymmetry
in the relation between the two cultures, and the assumed ‘ideologization’ in the
Russian case and the lack thereof in the German case. The authors, together
inhabiting as it were the shared discursive space of both philosophical cultures,
while at the same time creating and expanding it, not only are aware of the
difference but concreticize it in their very choice of words and expressions—they
thus realize it in the two senses of that verb. It is, of course, also possible to be naïve
in this respect, but that would be to miss the specificity of philosophical culture that
is constitutive for both mutual understanding and misunderstanding. The authors in
question are certainly not naı¨ve in this respect.
Where is the common ground? 273
123
Conclusion
The model of philosophical culture that emerges from the examples discussed in this
paper is of course bound to the case under examination, i.e. the interaction between
West European (French and German) and Russian philosophical culture, and it
remains to be seen whether and how the same model suits other cases. Also, the
interaction here addressed must be seen against the background of, on the one hand,
twentieth century European history,18 with the Soviet system and the post-World
War II division of the continent as major determining factors, and, on the other
hand, a much longer period of interaction and influence (largely one way) that was
broken off by the events of 1917 and 1922.19 Russian and West European
philosophical cultures have long known about each other, the Silver Age in Russia
being a period of flourishing and increased interaction between them. The attempt to
start again from the period of interaction during the first two decades of the
twentieth century, is one of the parameters of Russian philosophical culture today.
In this sense, we are dealing with a rather specific situation. Nevertheless, we can
state a few general conclusions.
First of all, we can assess the interaction between representatives of two different
philosophical cultures with the help of the concept of “horizon of understanding.”
[Husserl]. Any philosophical culture (or other communicative space) functions by
virtue of a shared horizon of understanding and perception that is not habitually
articulated, but presupposed. The encounter with another philosophical culture can
be called successful to the extent to which participants succeed in expanding their
horizon, an attempt that can, ultimately, lead to a fusion of horizons. The friendship
between Althusser and Mamardasˇvili shows a remarkable contrast between the utter
failure of the former to open up the horizon of his dogmatic Marxism, both
philosophically and politically, and the principled openness of the latter, who lost
his illusions concerning ‘socialism’ in 1968. In their case, what worked in the
kitchen did not work in philosophy. If we read Derrida’s account of his trip to the
USSR, “Back from Moscow, in the USSR,” which he presented in California after
his return (and which inevitably involves both the Beatles and the Beach Boys)
(Derrida 1995, 26f), we witness a courageous attempt to expand his horizon under
simultaneous recognition of the impossibility of such an attempt. In a typically
Derridaean paradox, the expansion of the horizons of the participants consists in the
shared recognition, yet irreducibly different perception of this impossibility. In the
case of Plotnikov and Haardt, finally, there already is the shared horizon of their
joint attempt to organize a Russian-German philosophical Begriffsgeschichte,
which, in the very recognition of the differences at stake, transcends them. Their
project is a projection of a new, common horizon, and when they present the
outcome of their endeavour to the two audiences they both place the two
philosophical cultures within the broader horizon of their comparative approach and
18 Cf. Epelboin (2008), 171: “Elles [the letters Mamardasˇvili and Althusser wrote to each other, EvdZ]
dessinent les contours d’une incomprehension qui, a` mon sens, ne concerne pas seulement deux individus
mais l’histoire du XXe sie`cle.”.
19 For a more detailed account, see Khoruzij (1995), Chamberlain (2006), and Van der Zweerde (2008).
274 E. Zweerde
123
make present the irredeemable differences between the two, not only in terms of
their ‘characteristic features’, but also in the terms of their mutual perception.
Ideally, we witness here two matching processes of horizon expansion, which can
lead to a shared discursive space: shared vocabulary, shared acknowledgement of
the perceived asymmetry between the two cultures, shared perception of possible
‘ideologization’ and ‘politicization’ of philosophy. Still, even if the field demarcated
by their respective horizons were identical, the horizons would be different because
different parts of each would be the ‘expanded’ ones. Therefore, a full fusion of the
horizons of given philosophical cultures can only emerge, I venture, in the case of,
say, a student of Haardt and Plotnikov who is ‘raised philosophically’ in this shared-
but-not-common horizon. However, this would be a third horizon from the
standpoint of each of the previous perspectives. All this may sound far-fetched or
abstract, but it is, I suggest, what really happens at any conference on Russian
philosophy in a Western country, and I see no reason why it would be any different
in other cases. (It can partly be compared to a situation in which scholars, raised in
different philosophical paradigms, try to understand each other, but I suggest that
such a situation still has a shared background.)
Secondly, the endeavour presented here figures among philosophical comparative
studies, it is part of what is usually called meta-philosophy. The task ahead, one
level up, would be that of ‘comparative comparative studies’, i.e. a comparison of
the ways in which philosophical cultures compare themselves with each other. My
general hypothesis for such an endeavour is that one is likely to find strong
resemblances and structural analogies in all such comparisons. I would expect there
to be an increasingly similar pattern in each philosophical culture. This is precisely
the meaning of ‘glocalization’ in this context, including the fact that each
philosophical culture, under conditions of mondialisation in the Derridaean sense,
relates to (potentially all) other philosophical cultures by developing a field of
comparative studies, thus reflecting, like a Leibnizian monad, all the others in itself.
The very possibility of writing this last sentence, however, implies that philosoph-
ical cultures are not Leibnizian monads, but transcend themselves in the way
suggested by Mamardasˇvili. From this angle and under conditions of mondialisa-
tion, any attempt to develop or protect a local philosophical culture, such as an
‘authentic Russian philosophical discourse’, is ‘reactionary’ in the literal sense of
that term, while any move to identify with global philosophical culture, however
nobly cosmopolitan its motivation, is to participate in a hegemonic structure that,
itself, must be transcended. The obvious critical question as to how a ‘neutral’ or
‘objective’ position is possible from which such statements can be made in the first
place is answered by the very question: to be able to pose this question presupposes
the non-coincidence of the place from which the question is posed with the space
comprising the range of possible answers.
Finally, all three cases here chosen are examples of concreteness. A partly
preserved and largely private correspondence between a half-dissident Georgian
bon-vivant and a intermittently depressed French dogmatic Marxist is perhaps
important in their respective biographies, but their friendship went unnoticed
outside small circles and it did not have major effects at the level of theory. On the
contrary: Epelboin shows that it did not affect Althusser’s thinking the way it might
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have, had his mind been as open as his heart. Besides, who today takes an interest in
the discussions among Marxist philosophers in the period before 1991? A visit by a
French-Algerian philosopher to the Institut ﬁlosoﬁi in Moscow was perhaps a ripple
on the surface of Russian history and a minor event in the history of philosophy as a
whole, however important it may have been for the participants. At the same time, it
is a crucial event in the interaction between two philosophical cultures, as is
materially testified by the publication of the proceedings in several languages. This
publication came about as the result of decisions to publish the materials, of existing
networks, expected audiences etc. There surely is a degree of contingency at play
here, as is the case in any ‘publication history’, but the crucial point, when it comes
to philosophical culture, is of course which publications succeed or fail, have effect
or drop dead, etc. By the end of the day, such ‘contingent’ events are what history
concretely consists of. Finally, a conference organized by a German and a Russian
philosopher on the topic of Personalita¨t/Пepcoнaльнocть is one of many joint
conferences on a variety of topics in a field, philosophy, that is academically
marginal anyway, while at the same time it is a concrete event in the revived
exchange between German and Russian philosophy, hosted by two key figures in
that exchange. This is not to inflate the importance of this particular event, but rather
to claim that this kind of event is what exchange between philosophical cultures
consists of.
What we can conclude at this point is that the historical development of the
interaction between philosophical cultures consists, at least partly, of such ‘minor’
events. It is in those encounters and exchanges that philosophical cultures appear in
their specificity: in mutual perceptions, expectations, and evaluations. Any model of
philosophical culture, and arguably any model of culture in general, must take this
into account—culture, philosophical or other, exists only as lived culture, not as
abstract model. At this point at least the ‘freethinking prisoner’ Mamardasˇvili rather
than the ‘self-confined’ Althusser was right, and Derrida was right to argue that,
although translation is impossible the very failure is itself successful exchange: “La
re´sistance a` la traduction est la traduction” (Derrida 1995, 121).
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